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Populism’s Global Impact on Immigrants and
Refugees: The Perspective of Eritrean
Refugees in Europe and Israel
JAMES YAP,† HILINA FESSAHAIE,‡ AND ENBAL SINGER‡

I. INTRODUCTION
The populist movements spreading across the globe today have
come in many different shapes and sizes. However, one attribute that
has been relatively consistent among them is that they have thrived
by stoking anger and resentment against smaller and more vulnerable
sectors of society. This has been a fundamental component of the
illiberal populist playbook. From Muslims in Modi’s India, to Kurds
in Erdogan’s Turkey, to Palestinians in Netanyahu’s Israel, populist
leaders have found that an effective and reliable technique to harness
general public disaffection for their own political benefit is to channel
it into hostility towards an already marginalized minority population
that lacks the political power to fight back.
In more economically developed countries, populists’ target of
choice has often been immigrants and refugees. For instance, in the
U.S., Trump rose to power to exuberant chants of “build the wall,”
and his administration has flaunted its harsh treatment of Central
American migrants as a badge of honor.1 In the U.K., the Brexit
movement was fueled to a large extent by resentment towards recent
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arrivals from other EU countries. And in continental Europe,
hostility towards asylum seekers arriving from the Middle East and
Africa has been the bread and butter of populist parties such as the
AfD in Germany, the National Rally (formerly National Front) in
France, and the Northern League in Italy. Even where such parties
do not hold power directly, their popularity and influence have
caused more moderate governments to shift towards tougher policies
on immigrants and refugees.2
Of course, such governments are subject to certain legal
constraints in the measures they can take to establish their antiimmigrant credentials with the electorate. In particular, under
international refugee law, people who have a legitimate fear of
persecution should they return to their country of origin are
considered to be refugees, and no country may deport them back to
their country of origin. The international refugee law system, which
is largely embodied in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
emerged in its present form in the aftermath of World War II, as a
response to the millions of people displaced by that conflict.3
The humanitarian principles underpinning the Refugee
Convention have now gained near universal acceptance globally, and
the Convention itself currently has 145 States Parties. However, the
recent global surge in illiberal populism, with its accompanying
hostility towards immigrants, has placed strain on this system. This
comment examines how illiberal populism has affected the
experience of the global population of refugees originating from one
particular country: Eritrea. It is hoped that the experience of this one
particular population illustrates some of the challenges that the global
rise of illiberal populism has posed for immigrants and refugees
generally.
II. BACKGROUND
Eritrea is a small country in the Horn of Africa that gained its
independence from Ethiopia in 1991. It has one of the world’s most
repressive governments.4 It has no constitution, active legislature,
2. MARTIN A. SCHAIN, SHIFTING TIDES: THE RADICAL-RIGHT POPULISM AND THE
IMMIGRATION POLICY IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 1 (Migration Policy Institute
2018).
3. Frances Nicholson & Judith Kumin, A Guide to International Refugee Protection
and Building State Asylum Systems, UNHCR (2017), https://www.unhcr.org/3d4aba564.pdf.
4. See
Countries
and
Territories,
FREEDOM
HOUSE
(2020),
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independent judiciary, elections, political opposition, or independent
media. It languishes under the dictatorial rule of Isaias Afewerki,
who has been president since independence.
Probably its most notorious practice, however, is its system of
universal forced labor that is euphemistically known as the “National
Service Program” (NSP). Under the pretext of fostering economic
development, effectively every Eritrean who reaches the age of 18 is
conscripted into the NSP and their labor becomes subject to complete
state control.5 This means that they are assigned to a job that they are
not allowed to leave without authorization, or, if they are judged to
possess certain aptitudes, further education or professional training,
upon completion of which they are then assigned to a job that they
are not allowed to leave without authorization. This program
encompasses effectively the country’s entire workforce, from manual
laborers on farms or in factories to white-collar professions such as
doctors, lawyers, judges, public servants, and engineers. Attempts to
flee one’s assigned job are met with severe punishment, including
arbitrary detention and/or torture. The NSP has been recognized by
the International Labor Organization (ILO) as constituting forced
labor and by the United Nations as constituting slavery.6
This unorthodox system has also been the primary motivation
cited for the thousands of Eritreans who flee the country as refugees
every year. According to United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) figures, despite its tiny population, Eritrea ranks
as the ninth largest country of origin for refugees with over half a
million Eritrean refugees living outside the country.7 Most of these
are in neighboring Ethiopia or Sudan. However, many have ventured
further afield, and these are largely concentrated in two main clusters.
The first cluster is in Israel. These refugees have made the
voyage over land through Sudan and Egypt, generally paying human
smugglers for their transport. Those who safely made this journey
before December 2013 have been able to enter Israel. After that,
however, a fence built for the purpose of stopping such migration has
https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores (showing a 2/100 “global freedom
score”).
5. Eritrea: Events in 2017, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 6, 2020),
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/eritrea.
6. See Service for Life: State Repression and Indefinite Conscription in Eritrea,
HUMAN
RIGHTS
WATCH
(Apr.
2009),
at
81-83,
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/eritrea0409web_0.pdf.
7. Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, UNHCR (June 20, 2019),
https://www.unhcr.org/5d08d7ee7.pdf.
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cut off this route.8
The second cluster is in Europe. These refugees have also
generally paid human smugglers for passage through the Sahara to
somewhere on the southern Mediterranean coast, typically Libya.
There, they board ships bound for a littoral country in Europe,
usually Italy.9
III. ERITREAN REFUGEES IN EUROPE
The ships that human smugglers use to transport migrants
originally from Eritrea (along with those from many other African
countries) across the Mediterranean into Europe are often in
dangerously poor condition. They often founder at sea with
calamitous results.
In October 2013, a shipwreck off of Lampedusa resulted in an
estimated 368 deaths.10 Later that month, the Italian government set
up a search and rescue operation named Mare Nostrum with the goal
of preventing similar tragedies in future. Because a previous
European Court of Human Rights ruling prevented Italy from
forcibly returning such migrants to Libya where they embarked due
to the human rights conditions and ongoing civil war there, all
migrants rescued at sea were being brought to Italy.11
However, Operation Mare Nostrum attracted vocal domestic
political opposition. Around the same time, the far-right Northern
League under its new leader Matteo Salvini was beginning the
ascension that would see it rise from roughly 5% popular support
nationally to key partner in the ruling coalition by 2018. Like many
of its European populist counterparts, it accomplished this in no small
part by aggressively campaigning on hardline positions on
immigration. In particular, they fostered hostility towards the Mare
Nostrum program and portrayed it as merely encouraging illegal
immigration to Europe at Italy’s expense.12 This political climate
8. Harriet Sherwood, Israeli Fence Construction Cuts Off Migration from Egypt, THE
GUARDIAN (Dec. 31, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/dec/31/israeli-fencecuts-migration-egypt.
9. Aryn Baker, Rescue at Sea: A Week on Board a Refugee Recovery Ship, TIME
(Mar. 6, 2020), https://time.com/refugee-rescue/.
10. Pierluigi Musaro, Mare Nostrum: The Visual Political of a Military-Humanitarian
Operation in the Mediterranean Sea, 39 MEDIA CULTURE & SOC’Y 11, 12 (2017).
11. Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy (no. 27765/09), Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014), available at:
https://www.refworld.org/cases,ECHR,4f4507942.html.
12. Julian Miglierini, Migrants Tell Migrants: Don’t Come to Italy, BBC NEWS (May
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made the program politically unviable. The Italian government
attempted to negotiate with other EU member states to share the
expense of this program.13 Here too, however, efforts were frustrated
by right-wing populist elements from other EU member states.14
Therefore, despite universally acknowledged success in its mission,
Mare Nostrum eventually ceased operations in October 2014, and
was replaced by a much more limited operation run by the EU’s
border agency, Frontex.15
The results corresponded with what would be expected. In the
following two years, the rate of fatalities of Europe-bound African
migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean spiked dramatically,16
punctuated by a shipwreck in April 2015 that cost an estimated 800
lives.17 This incident, combined with the dramatic surge that year of
refugees arriving through Turkey from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq,
thrust the issue of Mediterranean migration into the spotlight of
European public discourse, creating what became commonly referred
to as Europe’s “migrant crisis.”
From 3,538 dead and missing trying to cross the Mediterranean
in 2014, the figure rose to 3,771 in 2015 and 5,096 in 2016.18 After
that, figures began to decline again as EU governments reached
controversial deals with the governments of Libya and Turkey (the
latter with respect to the somewhat less deadly but still highly
dangerous route common taken by Middle Eastern migrants from
Turkey to Greece) to stem the flow of migrants by intercepting them
before they boarded ships bound for Europe.19 Italy’s deal with
10, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-eu-27352480.
13. Steve Scherer & Ilari Polleschi, Italy in Talks with EU to Share Responsibility for
Boat Migrants, REUTERS (July 8, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-italymigrants/italy-in-talks-with-eu-to-share-responsibility-for-boat-migrantsidUSKBN0FD1YL20140708.
14. Emily
Koller,
Mare
Nostrum
v.
Triton
(2017)
(unpublished),
https://munkschool.utoronto.ca/ceres/files/2017/10/Paper-Emily-Koller.pdf.
15. The New European Operation Frontex Plus/Triton: an operation with differing
objectives and more limited means than the Mare Nostrom operation, AEDH (Oct. 13,
2014), http://www.aedh.eu/en/the-new-european-operation-frontex-plustriton-an-operationwith-differing-objectives-and-more-limited-means-than-the-mare-nostrum-operation.
16. Migrant deaths in Mediterranean hit record in 2016-UN, BBC NEWS (Oct. 26,
2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37779228.
17. IOM Counts 3,371 Migrant Fatalities in Mediterranean in 2015, ION UN
MIGRATION (Jan. 5, 2016), https://www.iom.int/news/iom-counts-3771-migrant-fatalitiesmediterranean-2015.
18. Operational
Data
Portal,
Mediterranean
Situation,
UNHCR,
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean, (last visited Apr. 28, 2020).
19. Declan Walsh & Jason Horowitz, Italy, Going it Alone, Stalls the Flow of Migrants.
But
at
What
Cost?
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
17,
2017),
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Libya, reached in February 2017, has been criticized by human rights
advocacy groups over allegations that it has led to would-be migrants
being detained in unacceptable conditions in Libyan detention
centers.20 Some of the alleged abuses suffered by Eritrean and other
refugees in Libya’s detention centers include: beatings, sexual abuse,
poor medical care, being trafficked to smugglers, and death.21 There
are also reports of migrants being shot by the Libyan Coast Guard.22
A challenge at the European Court of Human Rights is currently
pending.23
Further, despite the drop in raw numbers, the Mediterranean
crossing from Libya to Italy remains more dangerous than it was
before. Particularly after 1,200 died attempting this crossing in April
2015, states and NGOs have attempted to fill the gap in search-andrescue operations left by Mare Nostrum, but have not quite succeeded
(due in part to Italian government efforts to impede NGO rescue
operations). In 2014, the only year for which Mare Nostrum was
operational throughout most of the year, the fatality rate for migrants
making this crossing stood at 1.81%.24 As of September 2019 it stood
at 3.63%.25
Thus, the anti-immigrant backlash associated with the rise of
illiberal populism in Europe has at least made the Mediterranean
crossing more difficult and more dangerous for African migrants.
Quite probably, it has also cost many lives. It has further induced
European governments to collaborate and enter agreements with
repressive governments with questionable human rights records, and
to turn a blind eye to the abuses these governments are allegedly
committing in connection with these agreements.

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/17/world/europe/italy-libya-migrant-crisis.html.
20. A Year after Italy-Libya Migration Deal, Time to Release Thousands Trapped in
Misery, AMNESTY INT’L (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/02/ayear-after-italy-libya-migration-deal-time-to-release-thousands-trapped-in-misery.
21. EU risks fuelling horrific abuse of refugees and migrants in Libya, AMNESTY INT’L
(June 14, 2016), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/06/eu-risks-fuelling-horrificabuse-of-refugees-and-migrants-in-libya.
22. Id.
23. S.S. and others v. Italy (no. 21660/18), Eur. Ct. H.R. (2019).
24. Ralph Janik, Mediterranean Refugees: Death Risk Rising, Asylum Prospects
Sinking,
EUROPEAN
DATA
JOURNALISM
(Sept.
7,
2019),
https://www.europeandatajournalism.eu/eng/News/Data-news/Mediterranean-refugeesdeath-risk-rising-asylum-prospects-sinking.
25. Mediterranean Migrant Arrivals Reach 76,558 in 2019, Deaths Reach 1,071, IOM
UN MIGRATION (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.iom.int/news/mediterranean-migrant-arrivalsreach-76558-2019-deaths-reach-1071.

YAP, FESSAHAIE, SINGER (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

POPULISM’S IMPACT ON IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES

2/21/21 1:13 PM

195

Despite the foregoing, thousands of migrants from Eritrea and
other countries in Africa—over 95% of those who attempt it—still
make the Mediterranean crossing successfully every year and land in
Europe. Under international refugee law, these are entitled to claim
refugee status in Europe. However Eritrean migrants, like many
others following the same route, tend not to do so in Italy where they
land. Instead they travel from Italy to other countries in the EU or
the Schengen zone, mostly in the corridor of Germanic language
speaking countries directly north of Italy, from Switzerland and
Germany in the south to Norway and Sweden in the north. Others are
to be found in countries such as the United Kingdom and France.
Because of the abysmal social and political conditions in their
country of origin, Eritreans can typically claim refugee status with a
very high success rate in these countries. For instance, in 2017 the
success rate for asylum applications from Eritrean nationals among
all EU and EFTA countries was 92.5%, comparable with Syria
(94.4%) and Yemen (93.3%).26
European countries receiving asylum applicants from Eritrea
have largely recognized and complied with their obligations under
international refugee law. However, some have sought other means
to reduce the number of Eritrean refugees.
For instance, it was in 2014 that the number of Eritrean asylum
seekers arriving in Europe surged, making them the second largest
such group after Syrians. The number of new arrivals in the first 10
months of that year nearly tripled the number from the previous
year.27 Following this, various European countries’ immigration
agencies attempted to revisit their policies towards asylum seekers
from Eritrea.
For instance, in November of the same year, the Danish
Immigration Services (DIS) issued a report suggesting that Eritrean
nationals who had illegally exited Eritrea or evaded the national
service there were not at risk of persecution if they returned to
Eritrea. Formerly, illegal exit and/or desertion had been a basis for
recognizing asylum claims by Eritrean nationals. After the release of
the report the DIS announced that it would no longer accept asylum
claims solely on the basis of illegal exit. However, the report met
26. Asylum Recognition Rates in the EU/EFTA by Country, 2008-2017, MIGRATION
POLICY INSTITUTE (Mar. 6, 2020), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/datahub/charts/asylum-recognition-rates-euefta-country-2008-2017.
27. Divers, Number of Eritreans Seeking Asylum in Europe Soars Over Figures For
Last Year, UNHCR (Nov. 14, 2014), https://www.unhcr.org/546606286.html.
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with strong public criticism, including from two of its researchers and
one of the experts it relied on. In response, the DIS quickly
backtracked on its earlier statement and effectively announced that
operations would continue as before.28 True to its statement, asylum
acceptance rates for Eritrean applicants in Denmark did not decrease
between 2014 and 2015; they in fact rose slightly from 93.3% to
97.5%.29
However, the DIS’ quick volte-face did not contain all the
damage. Because rules on refugee status determination in every
country are, in theory, derived from the same international law, and
because simple factual information on Eritrea is applicable anywhere,
agencies in different countries commonly refer to each other’s
published materials. In March 2015, the UK Home Office (the
executive agency responsible for immigration) issued two briefings,
partly relying on the Danish report, also suggesting that the risk of
persecution for Eritrean nationals upon returning to the country was
not as great as previously thought.
This time, the Home Office fully implemented the guidance
given in the new briefings, and asylum application acceptance rates
from Eritreans in the UK plummeted from 87.1% in 2014 to 47.5%
the next year.30 However, acceptance rates recovered after a
significant court decision released in October 2016 ruled that the
information contained in the March 2015 Home Office briefings was
not credible.31 Even before that, 87% of applicants refused on the
basis of the March 2015 briefings had their refusals overturned by
judges on appeal.32 Internal Home Office documents released to the
public later revealed that the March 2015 documents were directly
related to efforts by the Home Office to reduce the number of
Eritreans granted asylum in the UK.33

28. MST and Others (national service – risk categories) Eritrea CG, [2016] UKUT
00443 (IAC), United Kingdom: Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber), at
paras. 35-41, available at: https://refworld.org/cases,GBR_UTIAC,57fc91fc4.html (last
visited Apr. 10, 2020).
29. See MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 26.
30. Id.
31. MST, supra note 28.
32. See Diane Taylor, Home Office Eritrea Guidance Softened to Reduce Asylum Seeker
Numbers, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 22, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/uknews/2017/jan/22/home-office-eritrea-guidance-softened-to-reduce-asylum-seeker-numbers.
33. See id.
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IV. ERITREAN REFUGEES IN ISRAEL
From 2006 to 2013, approximately 64,000 individuals from
Eritrea, Sudan, and several other African countries entered Israel
seeking asylum via the Sinai desert.34 Of those, an estimated 34,475
were Eritrean.35 As of the government’s most recent reporting, only
32,090 African asylum seekers remain, 22,728 of which are
Eritrean.36
Israel is a party to the Refugee Convention. However, as a
country which follows a dualist legal approach to international law,
as its fellow common law jurisdictions typically do, Israel’s “treaty
obligations are not directly enforceable in Israeli courts unless and
until the Knesset incorporates them into law.”37 Israel has not
incorporated its obligations under the Refugee Convention into
domestic law.38
Until 2013, Israel did not allow Eritreans or Sudanese
individuals to access refugee status determination (RSD) procedures
at all. Since then, the vast majority of applications have been rejected
or are still pending. Out of a total of 17,778 applications to the RSD
unit, only 45 (0.25%) have been successful.39 Israel, for the most
part, refuses to recognize the claims of what would seem to be
perfectly legitimate refugees, and instead maintains the official
position that they are “labour migrants” or “infiltrators” of the state.40
Instead of legal status, they receive “conditional release” documents.
The “conditional release” is from detention and deportation, which
the state maintains it may carry out at any time.41
In practice, the Israeli government stops short of carrying out
forcible refoulement of asylum seekers, in compliance with the
34. Gerry Simpson, “Make Their Lives Miserable”: Israel’s Coercion of Eritrean and
Sudanese Asylum Seekers to Leave Israel”, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2014),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/09/09/make-their-lives-miserable/israels-coercion-eritreanand-sudanese-asylum-seekers.
35. Eli Shani et al, No Safe Haven: Israeli asylum policy as applied to Eritrean and
Sudanese citizens (December 2014), HOTLINE FOR REFUGEES AND MIGRANT WORKERS,
https://hotline.org.il/en/publication/no-safe-haven.
36. Population & Immigration Authority, ( נתוני זרים בישראלOctober 2019),
https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/foreign_workers_stats_q3_2019/he/foreign_workers_
stats_q3_2019.pdf.
37. Ruven Ziegler, No Asylum for ‘Infiltrators’: The Legal Predicament of Eritrean and
Sudanese Nationals in Israel, 29:2 J. IMMIGR., ASYLUM, & NAT’LITY L. 172, 174 (2015).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 181.
40. Id. at 189.
41. Id. at 181-82.
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Refugee Convention.42 Instead, however, it follows a tactic of
making conditions of life for asylum seekers in Israel such that they
are “persuaded” to leave on their own.
A central component of this strategy of pressuring Eritreans into
leaving has been the immigration detention system. The largest
single institution used for this purpose was the Holot facility, which
opened in December 2013 and saw the detention of 13,000 male
asylum seekers until it shut in 2018.43 Initially designed for indefinite
detention, challenges by human rights organizations to the High
Court of Justice forced the government to reduce the period of
detention or close the facility, leading to one year detention periods.44
From 2007 to 2013, Eritrean women and children were also detained
in the Saharonim prison.45
Additionally, from May 2017, the Israeli government has
required employers to deduct 20% of asylum seekers’ wages to be
put in a designated fund that can only be accessed if and when the
individual leaves Israel.46 This resulted in many asylum seekers
being paid below minimum wage, undocumented employment,
poverty, and working more physically demanding labor.47
Furthermore, the employment rights organization which assisted
asylum seekers in accessing their funds reported that in 45% of cases,
employers had either not deposited funds at all or deposited
incomplete amounts.48 This provided a further impetus for Eritrean
and other asylum seekers to leave the country – although this
measure, too, was challenged in court and ultimately struck down by
the Israeli Supreme Court in April 2020.
The country also purportedly entered into agreements with
42. Id. at 180.
43. Anat Guthmann, Immigration Detention in Israel: Annual Monitoring Report 2018,
HOTLINE
FOR
REFUGEES
AND
MIGRANTS
(2018),
https://hotline.org.il/en/immigrationdetentionmonitoring2018.
44. Id.
45. HOTLINE FOR MIGRANT WORKERS, Detention of Minors and Children Arriving from
the Sinai Desert (September 23, 2012), https://hotline.org.il/en/publication/detention-ofminors-and-children-arriving-from-the-sinai-desert/.
46. Anat Guthmann & Noa Kaufmann, In Broad Daylight: The Deposit Law:
Implementation
&
Impact,
THE
WORKER’S
HOTLINE
(May
2019),
https://www.kavlaoved.org.il/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2019/05/Eng-Deposit-LawReport-HRM-KLO2019Web.pdf?fbclid=IwAR3g7W2PNKsODm5BIazWhp_T5xsogFtdDo2lzoLj8wBz3767u5
kVYD_lxoE.
47. Id. at 11.
48. Id. at 24.
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Uganda and Rwanda in 2014 to receive asylum seekers who had
“voluntarily” left Israel, to give them a more enticing option than
returning to their home countries.49 Reports by NGOs have argued
that this system is hardly voluntary as individuals are given a choice
between indefinite detention and deportation.50 These reports also
found that those who were transferred to Rwanda and Uganda were
not given refugee status nor state protection, contrary to assurances
made by Israeli officials.51
In 2017, the Supreme Court of Israel stated that it would not be a
violation of Israeli law to forcefully deport individuals if it was to
safe third countries, and subsequently the Knesset voted for a bill to
allow for deportations.52 However, the UN Committee against
Torture has stated that collective deportation, without an objective
examination of individual cases in regard to personal risk, would still
violate the obligation against non-refoulement.53
In 2018, human rights advocates filed a challenge to the bill in
Israeli court. The court demanded that the state attorney produce the
agreements with third countries and that the deportations should be
suspended until the court can assess the agreements.54 The Israeli
government failed to produce the agreements and subsequently
abandoned forced deportation plans.55 Israel’s lack of elected
49. The agreements are considered “secret” because their contents have still not been
released but it is widely believed that individuals were sent to Rwanda or Uganda. See e.g.,
Michael Schaeffer, Rwanda is out, but Israel says it can still deport refugees to — Uganda?,
+972 MAGAZINE (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.972mag.com/rwanda-is-out-but-israel-says-itcan-still-deport-refugees-to-uganda/.
50. Adi Drori Avraham et al., Where There Is No Free Will: Israel’s “Voluntary
Return” Procedure for Asylum Seekers, HOTLINE FOR REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS (2015), at 5,
http://hotline.org.il/en/publication/where-there-is-no-free-will; see also Lior Birger, Shahar
Shoham & Liat Bolzman, Better a Prison in Israel than Dying on the way, HOTLINE FOR
REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS (2018), https://hotline.org.il/en/publication/better-a-prison-inisrael-than-dying-on-the-way/.
51. See Avraham et al., supra note 50, at 26.
52. Michael Bachner & Toi Staff, Netanyahu says Africans slated for deportation “not
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government over the last year has prevented further similar bills.
“Voluntary” deportations continue, however, averaging about 185
Eritreans per month in 2019.56 The government has not published
their destinations, leaving it unknown how many are setting up new
lives in Canada or beginning a new journey for safety in Africa.
These measures against asylum seekers have been fueled by
anti-refugee sentiment in the public and political arenas. In 2018, the
Netanyahu government signed an unprecedented agreement with the
UNHCR to give temporary legal status to over 20,000 asylum seekers
in exchange for the UNHCR resettling 16,250 in its partner countries.
Within just a few hours, Netanyahu reneged on his agreement as a
result of criticism from Naftali Bennet, the leader of a far-right party
within the ruling coalition.57 What could have been a model for
responsibility sharing in refugee resettlement was lost due to the
same illiberal populist elements endangering the lives of asylum
seekers globally.
V. CONCLUSION
Thus, Eritreans fleeing repression in their home country have in
recent years encountered rising levels of hostility in both Europe and
Israel. In both places, populist elements have prompted governments
to adopt various measures to both reduce the number of arrivals as
well as reduce the numbers already inside the country. These
measures have had serious deleterious impacts on the lives and safety
of Eritrean refugees there.
The example of Eritrean migrants in this part of the world
merely illustrates the impact that populism can have on the
experience of any group of immigrants or refugees anywhere. It has
made the lives of Eritrean migrants more difficult and less safe. The
popularity of hardline anti-immigrant policies and the politicians who
espouse them has induced governments to adopt measures to reduce
the flow of migration, often in ways that are inconsistent with the
humanitarian principles embodied in the Refugee Convention.
However, there is perhaps some small measure of comfort that
can be derived in the circumstances. Although these countries have
migrants/israel-abandons-plan-to-forcibly-deport-african-migrants-idUSKBN1HV20Y.
56. Population & Immigration Authority, supra note 36, at 4.
57. Isabel Kershner, Israeli Leader is Forced to Retreat on African Migrant Deal, THE
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/02/world/middleeast/israelafrican-migrants-un-resettlement.html.
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attempted many different ways to circumvent their obligations under
the Refugee Convention, none have gone so far as to directly and
openly contravene them. The fact that the international refugee law
system has been tested but has so far held firm shows that it is
serving its purpose. International laws on refugee protection exist
precisely because states are often inclined to act differently than how
the law prescribes. That this should turn out to be the case is not by
itself necessarily alarming or even surprising. Ultimately, where
courts have upheld the rights of refugees, those rulings have
generally been respected and the rule of law has prevailed.
Further, some coordinated attempts are being made to buttress
the international refugee protection system to avoid some of the
problems that have arisen in the past few years. For instance, the
Global Compact on Refugees was created by UN member states in
2018. Whereas the Refugee Convention sets out the international
legal obligations of states towards refugees, the Global Compact
focuses on how those obligations can be shared between states.
Although it is not legally binding, it hopes to engender the
mobilization of political will and international cooperation required
to provide effective coordinated protection for refugees globally.58
Of course, none of this is of any solace to those who drowned in
the Mediterranean. What is more, every attack erodes the system a
little further. Today’s populists are not the first to direct hostility at
the institutions that protect immigrants and refugees and their rights.
However, they have certainly inflicted damage upon those
institutions. It is unclear if that damage can or ever will be repaired.

58. Global Compact on Refugees: How is this different from the migrants’ pact and how
will it help?, UN NEWS (Dec. 17, 2018), https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/12/1028641.

